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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
James Henry Crumble appeals from the district court's order denying his 
motion to disqualify the district court judge who presided over his criminal case. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
In July 2005, the state charged Crumble with rape for an act he committed 
against a twelve-year-old girl, and burglary for entering an individual's garage 
with the intent to commit theft. (#33625/#33627 R., 1 pp.22-23, 138-139.) 
Pursuant to an I.C.R. 11 agreement, Crumble pied guilty to burglary and an 
amended charge of assault with the intent to commit a serious felony. 
(#33625/#33627 12/9/05 Tr., p.54, L.2 - p.64, L.11.) The parties stipulated to the 
imposition of concurrent sentences. (#33625/#33627 12/9/05 Tr., p.55, Ls.12-
20.) The parties also stipulated that Crumble would participate in a psychosexual 
evaluation. (#33625/#33627 12/9/05 Tr., p.64, L.17 - p.65, L.11.) Prior to 
accepting the pleas, the district court informed the parties that it would defer its 
decision to accept or reject the agreement until it had the opportunity to review 
the presentence investigation report. (#33625/#33627 12/9/05 Tr., p.57, Ls.2-
20.) 
At the scheduled sentencing hearing, the court stated that based upon its 
review of the information contained in the presentence investigation report and 
psychosexual evaluation, it would reject the plea agreement, and would not bind 
1 By its order dated October 4, 2011, the Idaho Supreme Court took judicial 
notice of the clerk's record and reporter's transcript filed in Crumble's prior 
consolidated appeal, Nos. 33625/33627, State v. Crumble. (10/4/11 Order.) 
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itself to the imposition of concurrent sentences. (#33625/#33627 6/5/06 Tr., 
p.35, L.7 - p.36, L.4.) The district court then granted Crumble's motion to 
withdraw his pleas. (#33625/#33627 6/5/06 Tr., p.37, L.25 - p.39, L.24.) Shortly 
thereafter, Crumble discharged his appointed counsel and proceeded pro se. 
(#33625/#33627 7/20/06 Tr., p.7, L.2 - p.8, L.21.) 
Several months later, Crumble pied guilty to burglary and an amended 
charge of lewd and lascivious conduct. (#33625/#33627 9/5/06 Tr., p.8, L.9 -
p.21, L.20.) The state again agreed to recommend concurrent sentences, and to 
withdraw a persistent violator enhancement. (#33625/#33627 9/5/06 Tr., p.7, 
Ls.6-21.) The district court granted Crumble's request for appointed counsel to 
represent him at the sentencing hearing. (#33625/#33627 9/5/06 Tr., p.23, Ls.1-
19.) 
The district court imposed a unified life sentence with 20 years fixed on 
the lewd and lascivious conduct charge, and a concurrent unified 10-year 
sentence with five years fixed on the burglary charge. (#33625/#33627 R., 
pp.106-109, 236-239; #33625/#33627 10/6/06 Tr., p.44, L.4 - p.45, L.14.) 
Crumble appealed, asserting only that his sentences were excessive, but the 
Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's sentences. State v. Crumble, 
Docket No. 33625/33627, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 688 (Idaho App., 
October 28, 2008). 
In December 2009, Crumble made pro se motions to withdraw his guilty 
pleas and to disqualify the district court judge who had presided over his case. 
(R., Vol. I, pp.14-44.) The district court denied Crumble's motion to disqualify, 
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but also appointed counsel to represent Crumble. (R., Vol. I, pp.45-49.) 
Appointed counsel filed a new motion to disqualify and an amended motion to 
withdraw Crumble's guilty pleas. (R., Vol. I, pp.76-81.) The motion to disqualify 
asserted that the district court judge was prejudiced against Crumble due to 
information contained in the presentence investigation report and psychosexual 
evaluation, and that this information was only before the court because 
Crumble's prior counsel failed to advise him of his rights not to participate in 
those evaluations. (R., Vol. I, pp.78-79.) After a hearing, the district court again 
denied Crumble's motion to disqualify. (R., Vol. I, pp.98-101; see generally, Tr.) 
The district court granted Crumble's LAR. 12(b) motion for permission to 
appeal its denial of his motion to disqualify. (R., Vol. I, pp.102-103, 110-111.) 
However, Crumble failed to file a motion with the Idaho Supreme Court 
requesting acceptance of the appeal by permission within 14 days thereafter, as 
required by I.AR. 12(c). (See R., Vol. I, p.119.) The Idaho Supreme Court 
dismissed the appeal. {R., Vol. I, p.121.) The district court then entered a 
renewed order permitting appeal of its denial of Crumble's motion to disqualify. 
(R., pp.122-123.) Crumble then filed a motion for permission to appeal with the 
Idaho Supreme Court, but the Idaho Supreme Court denied the motion. (R., Vol. 
I, p.124.) 
Several months later, the district court granted Crumble post-conviction 
relief in the form of re-entering Crumble's original judgment of conviction, for the 
2 Because the appellate record in this case does not contain Crumble's post-
conviction petition, it is unclear whether Crumble made other post-conviction 
claims, such as ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
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purpose of providing Crumble the right to appeal the judgment and to "assert and 
pursue all issues arising from the trial proceedings, including sentencing 
proceedings, and as may be further encompassed by the existing Motions under 
I.C.R. 33 in Bonner County Case Nos. CR 2005-4811 and CR 2005-5148." (R., 
Vol. I, pp.129-132.) Crumble timely appealed from this re-entered judgment of 
conviction. (R., Vol. I, pp.133-136.) 
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ISSUES 
Crumble states the issue on appeal as: 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED 
THE MOTION TO DISQUALIFY BECAUSE IT APPLIED THE WRONG 
LAW 
(Appellant's brief, p. 4 (capitalization in original).) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 




The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Entertain Crumble's Motion To 
Disqualify 
A. Introduction 
Crumble asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
disqualify. (See generally, Appellant's brief.) However, because Crumble's 
judgments of conviction had already become final when he made his motion, the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. Further, even if the district court 
had such jurisdiction, Crumble's motion to disqualify, and any appellate review of 
the district court's denial of that motion, is moot. 
B. The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Entertain Crumble's Motion To 
Disqualify 
"Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial court's 
jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment 
becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the 
judgment on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 
(2003) (footnote omitted). A challenge to a court's subject matter jurisdiction may 
be raised at any time, including for the first time on appeal. State v. Armstrong, 
146 Idaho 372, 374, 195 P.3d 731, 733 (Ct. App. 2008). A court's lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties. Id. An order entered 
without subject matter jurisdiction is void. Troupis v. Summer, 148 Idaho 77, 79, 
218 P.3d 1138, 1140 (2009); State v. Peterson, 148 Idaho 610, 226 P.3d 552 
(Ct. App. 2010). 
6 
Crumble's judgments of conviction for lewd and lascivious conduct and 
burglary became final when the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed Crumble's 
sentences on direct appeal. Crumble, 2008 Unpublished Opinion No. 688. The 
district court was thus without jurisdiction to entertain Crumble's subsequent 
motions, made more than a year later, to disqualify the district court judge and to 
withdraw his guilty pleas. Each of the district court's orders entered in these 
criminal cases after the judgments became final is void. 
On appeal, Crumble suggests that l.C.R. 25(c), which permits a party to 
move to disqualify a judge for cause "at any time," confers jurisdiction on a court 
to entertain such a motion even after a judgment has become final. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.5-7.) However, it was not untimeliness that precluded the court from 
entertaining Crumble's motion; it was the fact that the court lacked jurisdiction to 
do so. Idaho Criminal Rule 25(c) does not provide a district court the authority to 
act in a case in which it lacks jurisdiction; it simply permits a defendant to move 
to disqualify a judge who actually has jurisdiction over a criminal case at any time 
during the proceedings. 
Nor did the district court's re-entry of Crumble's judgment of conviction 
retroactively confer jurisdiction upon the court to entertain Crumble's motion to 
disqualify. The re-entry of a judgment of conviction allows a defendant the 
opportunity to appeal a conviction where ineffective defense counsel had 
neglected or refused to file an appeal despite a defendant's request to do so. 
Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 362, 883 P.2d 714, 720 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Crumble has not been denied an appeal. A district court may not confer subject 
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matter jurisdiction upon itself to enter substantive orders years after a criminal 
judgment becomes final simply by re-entering the judgment. Cf. State v. Ciccone 
150 Idaho 305, 306-308, 246 P.3d 958, 959-961 (2010) (holding that the district 
court's re-entry of a judgment of conviction did not enlarge the time for filing an 
appeal where the re-entered judgment did not alter the material terms of the 
defendant's sentence.) 
Even if I.C.R. 25 extended the district court's jurisdiction and permitted it 
to consider Crumble's motion for disqualification, any appellate review of the 
district court's denial of the motion is moot. "A case is moot if it presents no 
justiciable controversy and a judicial determination will have no practical effect 
upon the outcome." In re Doe I, 145 Idaho 337, 340, 179 P.3d 300, 303 (2008) 
(quoting Goodson v. Nez Perce Bd. of County Comm'rs, 133 Idaho 851, 853, 993 
P.2d 614, 616 (2000)). The mootness doctrine precludes review when "the 
issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable 
interest in the outcome." Idaho Schools for Equal Educ. Opp. v. Idaho State Bd. 
of Educ., 128 Idaho 276, 281, 912 P.2d 644, 649 (1996) (quoting Bradshaw v. 
State, 120 Idaho 429,432,816 P.2d 986,989 (1991)). 
In this case, even if the district court had jurisdiction to entertain Crumble's 
motion to disqualify, neither the court's decision to grant or deny the motion, nor 
any appellate review of that decision, could have any practical effect upon the 
outcome of Crumble's criminal proceedings. For the reasons discussed above, a 
newly assigned district court judge would have no jurisdiction to rule on 
Crumble's motion to withdraw his guilty plea, nor would it have jurisdiction to 
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enter any other substantive orders in Crumble's criminal case. See Peterson, 
148 Idaho at 614, 226 P.3d at 557 (holding that a motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
may not be granted after a judgment becomes final). Crumble's appellate 
challenge is moot. 
The district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Crumble's motion to 
disqualify. The district court's orders entered after Crumble's judgments of 
conviction became final are void. Crumble has failed to demonstrate that he is 
entitled to relief on appeal. 
DATED this 20th day of December 2012 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Crumble's convictions 
for lewd and lascivious conduct and burglary. 
MARK W. OLSON '-
Deputy Attorney General 
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